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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, §3 of 
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann. §§35A-4-508(8)(a)? 78A-4-103, 63G-4-403; and 
Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was the Workforce Appeals Board's decision that the Claimant was discharged 
for just cause reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in the record? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question of whether the Employer had just cause to discharge the Claimant is 
a mixed question of law and fact under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Johnson 
v. Department ofEmp't Sec, 882 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When reviewing 
an agency's application of the law to a particular set of facts, the Court gives a degree of 
deference to the agency and will uphold the Board's decision so long as the decision is 
"within the realm of reasonableness and rationality." EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of 
Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App. 43, <|J43. The Board's findings will be reversed "only if 
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 
939P.2dl77, 181 (Utah 1997). 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of evidence . . . though 
something less than the weight of the evidence." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/ 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, [^35 (omission in original) 
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(internal quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, an administrative decision "meets 
the substantial evidence test when a reasonable mind might accept as adequate the 
evidence supporting the decision." Id. An agency's findings of facts are accorded 
substantial deference and will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if 
another conclusion may be formed from the evidence. See Prosper Team, Inc. v. 
Department of Workforce Servs., 2011 UT App. 246, ^|7, citing Hurley v. Board of 
Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). 
Moreover, this Court will "defer to the Board's assessment of conflicting 
evidence." Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp't Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). It is not the court's "role to judge the relative credibility of the witnesses." 
Id. "It is the province of the Board, not the appellate courts, to resolve conflicting 
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is 
for the Board to draw the inferences." Id. 
STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim 
in Addendum A, and include the following: 
§35A-4-405(2), Utah Code Annotated 
§35A-4-508(8)(a), Utah Code Annotated 
§63G-4-403, Utah Code Annotated 
§78A-4-103, Utah Code Annotated 
R994-405-202, Utah Administrative Code 
R994-405-208, Utah Administrative Code 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
This is an appeal from an unemployment compensation decision by the Workforce 
Appeals Board (Board) of the Department of Workforce Services (Department). 
The Claimant, Ranae Nicol, filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits 
after the Employer, Wells Fargo Bank, terminated her employment. On November 14, 
2011, the Department issued a decision finding the Claimant had been discharged from 
her employment with just cause and was therefore ineligible for benefits under the Utah 
Employment Security Act, Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2)(a). (All Utah Code 
provisions are found sequentially at Addendum A, Department decision at Addendum B). 
The Claimant appealed the Department decision to an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). After an evidentiary hearing at which the Claimant and Employer were present, 
the ALJ determined the Employer met its burden to prove it discharged the Claimant for 
just cause under Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2). (Addendum C). The Claimant 
subsequently appealed that decision to the Workforce Appeals Board. The Board upheld 
the decision of the ALJ. (Addendum D). The Claimant then requested reconsideration of 
the Board's decision, which the Board denied. (Addendum D). The present petition for 
review ensued. 
B. Statement of the Facts. 
The Board supplements and corrects the Employer's Statement of the Facts as 
follows: 
1 
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The Claimant worked for the Employer as a banker from June 14, 2010, until she 
was discharged on October 31, 2011. (Record, 026: 9-10). The Employer's policy 
describes incidents of serious misconduct it considers sufficiently egregious so as to 
justify immediate discharge. (R, 012; 028: 6-10). The policy states that the Employer's 
customers and employees expect "adherence to high standards of integrity, honesty, and 
trust" as outlined in the policy. (Id.). Pursuant to the policy, employees are prohibited 
from handling or approving transactions on their own accounts or accounts of family 
members. (R, 013). This includes reversing service charges or fees. (Id.). The Claimant 
received a copy of this policy on June 14, 2010, and signed an acknowledgement that she 
understood she could be terminated immediately for violating the policy. (R, 015; 029: 
15-18). 
The Claimant maintained a joint account with her son. (R, 030: 41-44; 031: 1-11). 
Sometime toward the end of September 2011 she noticed a $10 fee and a $35 overdraft 
fee on the account while she was assisting another customer. (R, 031: 19-24). The 
Claimant thought the fees should not have been added to the account based on the nature 
of the account. (R, 031: 21-23). The $10 fee directly related to the overdraft fee. (R, 
033:32-39). 
The Employer expects employees who are disputing a fee on their account to 
contact customer service as any customer would. (R, 027: 25-28). It is not acceptable for 
an employee to reverse the fee personally. (R, 013; 027: 25-28). The Claimant, however, 
approached a supervisor about the fee. (R, 031: 22-25; 032: 1-16). The supervisor told 
the Claimant that if she reversed the fee on her own she did so at her own risk. (R, 031: 
4 
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23-44; 032: 13-16, 42-44). The Claimant could have called the Employer's customer 
service department and asked for the fees to be reversed or instructed her son to do so. 
(R, 027: 38-40). Rather than contacting customer service, however, the Claimant 
reversed the fees herself. (R, 033: 32-33). The Employer later audited the transaction 
and discharged the Claimant for reversing the fees herself. (R, 028: 23-24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Board correctly determined the Employer established just cause for its 
decision to discharge the Claimant. The Employer established that its legitimate interests 
were threatened by the Claimant's willful violation of its policy, that she knew her 
conduct was expressly prohibited by the policy, and that she had the requisite control 
over the conduct that led to her discharge. The Board's decision to deny benefits is 
reasonable and rational. It is supported by substantial evidence in the record and this 
Court should deny the Claimant's appeal. 
On appeal to this Court, the Claimant argues the Employer failed to establish the 
element of culpability and thus failed to establish just cause for its decision to discharge 
her. She does not appear to challenge the Board's determination that the Employer 
satisfied the elements of knowledge and control, arguing instead that the Employer failed 
to establish that its interests were so threatened by her conduct that it justified her 
immediate discharge 
The Employer, however, demonstrated that the Claimant willfully violated a 
known, reasonable policy in reversing the fees on the account she shared with her son. 
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The policy exists to ensure the Employer's employees adhere to the highest standards of 
integrity, honesty, and trust. When the Claimant ignored the policy she did so at her own 
peril, demonstrating dishonesty and a disregard for the Employer's interests it could not 
tolerate. 
The Claimant also failed to marshal the evidence to show the Board's decision is 
not supported by substantial evidence, marshaling only the evidence supporting her 
contention that she was discharged without just cause and ignoring any evidence contrary 
to her desired outcome. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD'S DECISION THAT THE EMPLOYER 
DISHARGED THE CLAIMANT FOR JUST CAUSE WAS 
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AND SHOULD BE 
UPHELD. 
A claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits if discharged without just cause 
as defined in Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202. (See Addendum A). In establishing 
whether a claimant was discharged for just cause, the employer has the burden of 
proving: (1) the claimant's culpability, (2) the claimant's knowledge of expected conduct, 
and (3) that the offending conduct was within the claimant's control. See Bhatia v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The employer 
must establish each of the three elements in order for the claimant to be denied benefits. 
Id., at 577. The Claimant was discharged for violating the Employer's policy regarding 
reversing fees on a personal account. An employer enjoys the prerogative to establish 
6 
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and enforce rules that further its legitimate business interests. Utah Admin. Code R994-
405-208. The Claimant violated such a rule in this instance. 
Here, the Board found the Employer satisfied the necessary elements to establish 
just cause. The Board agreed with the Employer that a single violation of a known policy 
that was intended to demonstrate integrity, honesty, and trust sufficiently threatened the 
Employer's legitimate interests that it necessitated the Claimant's immediate discharge. 
The Claimant understood the policy and had received training in how to comply with the 
policy. She also sought advice from her supervisor and was told that if she personally 
reversed the fees on her account, in violation of the policy, she did so at her own risk. 
A. The Employer Established the Element of Culpability 
In order to demonstrate the element of culpability, the Employer must show the 
conduct causing the discharge to be so serious that continuing the employment 
relationship would jeopardize its legitimate interests. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
202(1). The Employer met its burden in this case. 
The Claimant argues the Employer failed to establish just cause for its decision to 
discharge her. The Claimant argues that the ALJ and the Board erred in their analysis of 
the case by failing to balance the employee's circumstances against the harm to the 
Employer. The Claimant argues she is entitled to benefits under the balancing criteria 
outlined in Gibson v. Department of Employment Security, wherein the Court stated that a 
finding of culpability requires a "balancing of the employee's past work record, the 
employee's length of employment, and the likelihood that the conduct will be repeated 
7 
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against the seriousness of the offense and the harm to the employer." Gibson, 840 P. 2d 
780, 784 (Utah Ct. App 1992). 
The Claimant argues specifically that she worked for the Employer for 16 months 
without incident, meaning her act of reversing fees was not a pattern of misconduct. The 
Claimant further argues her conduct would likely not reoccur, was not overly serious, and 
did not subject the Employer to actual harm. As such, the Claimant argues, the harm to 
the Employer and the seriousness of the conduct did not outweigh the Claimant's work 
history, length of employment, and the likelihood that her conduct would be repeated. 
The Board, however, correctly balanced the factors in this case and determined 
the seriousness of the offense sufficiently jeopardized the Employer's legitimate interests 
such that it necessitated her immediate discharge. The culpability standard does not 
require actual harm to the employer, only potential harm. Fieeiki v. Dept. of Workforce 
Services, 2005 UT App. 398, J^3. The harm to the employer may be actual or potential, 
and potential harm may be shown from a single violation if that violation is sufficiently 
serious or harmful. Id. lfl|3-4. In Fieeki, the Claimant, a law enforcement officer, was 
discharged after domestic violence charges against him were substantiated. The Court 
determined the Claimant's conduct was not an innocent mistake or an incident of poor 
judgment, but rather a "volitional act with consequences of which a law enforcement 
officer is, or should be, aware." Id.; J^5; see also Lane v. Board of Review, 727 P. 2d 206, 
211 (Utah 1986) ("the degree of culpability which will disqualify an employee from 
receiving benefits involves volitional acts by an employee who could not have been 
heedless of their consequences"). 
8 
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The Court further reasoned that while the rule states a single incident may not be 
sufficient to establish the element of culpability, the use of the word "may" in the rule 
"contemplates situations where potential harm could be shown from a single rule 
violation." Id., 1J4, citing Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Utah 1985); see 
also Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(l). As such, the Court reasoned, "the proper 
emphasis under the culpability requirement should not be upon the number of violations; 
rather, it should address the problem of whether the discharge was 'necessary to avoid 
actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful interests." Fieeki, at ]j4. 
The Claimant in this instance engaged in a dishonest, volitional act with 
consequences of which she could not have been heedless. The Claimant understood the 
Employer's policy that employees were prohibited from handling their own account, 
including reversing charges and fees. (R, 015; 032: 32-33; 035: 14-19). She received a 
copy of the Employer's policy and should have known the Employer considered a single 
violation of the policy to be sufficiently serious to warrant her discharge. (R, 012). The 
Claimant's position required her to act with a high degree of integrity and honesty. To 
this end the Employer promulgated a policy that prohibited employees from working on 
their own accounts. Indeed, the policy was intended to demonstrate integrity, honesty, 
and trust, both among employees and with the public, and to protect the Employer's 
financial and regulatory interests. If employees were allowed to work on their own 
accounts in a manner not available to the general public it could greatly damage the 
Employer's reputation with its customers and adversely affect the Employer's belief the 
Claimant performed her duties in an honest and transparent manner. 
Q 
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In this instance, the Board correctly determined the Claimant's conduct, though a 
single act, was sufficiently serious that it outweighed the Claimant's work history, the 
length of her time with the Employer, and the likelihood that it would happen again. The 
Claimant reversed fees on the account she shared with her son, willfully violating a 
known policy that she knew, or should have known, would result in her discharge. (R, 
012; 013; 030; 41-44; 031: 1-11; 033: 32-33). She had been advised by her supervisor 
that she did so at her own peril. (R, 031: 23-44; 032: 13-16, 42-44). 
The Claimant had only worked for the Employer for little more than a year. 
Though she had not violated the policy in her 16 months with the Employer, given her 
disregard for the Employer's policy there is no indication in the record she would not 
have violated the policy once more if she again found it inconvenient to follow the 
policy. The policy is reasonable and designed to protect the Employer's rightful interests. 
As such, regardless of how long the Claimant worked for the Employer, and regardless of 
whether she had ever been disciplined for this sort of conduct, the seriousness of the act 
coupled with the disregard for the Employer's policy and her disregard for her 
supervisor's warning, gave the Employer little option other than to discharge her. 
The Board's finding that the Employer established the element of culpability was 
reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence. As such, the Board's 
determination that the Employer established culpability should be upheld. 
B. The Employer Established the Eiements of Knowledge and Control 
Though not challenged on appeal, the Board correctly determined the Employer 
also established the elements of knowledge and control. In order to establish the element 
10 
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of knowledge, the Employer must show the Claimant understood the conduct the 
Employer expected. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(2). The Employer must also show 
the Claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of her conduct. Id. 
To establish the element of control, the Employer must show the conduct causing the 
discharge was within the Claimant's control. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(3)(a). 
The Claimant understood the Employer's expectations. She knew, or should have 
known, that the Employer's policy prohibited her conduct in this matter. (R, 012; 013). 
The Claimant had been trained on and received a copy of the policy, and had also 
acknowledged she understood the policy and knew she could be discharged for violating 
it. (R, 015; 029: 15-18). She knew she was prohibited from handling her own account in 
this manner and had been advised by her supervisor that she did so at her own peril. (R, 
031: 23-44; 032: 13-16, 32-33, 42-44). When confronted by the Employer, the Claimant 
admitted she knew she was not supposed to handle her own account. (R, 035: 14-19). As 
such, she should have been able to anticipate the negative consequences that would result 
from reversing the fees on her personal account. 
The Claimant was also in control of the conduct that led to her discharge. The 
Claimant was not forced to reverse the fees. She had other options. The Claimant could 
have contacted customer service and asked that the fees be reversed as would any 
customer. (R, 027: 25-28). Indeed, this is the Employer's expectation with regard to 
employee accounts. (Id.). The Claimant also could have asked her son to contact 
customer service to address the fees. She could have altered her conduct in a variety of 
ways in order to avoid being discharged. 
11 
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The Board's determination that the Employer established the elements of 
knowledge and control was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in 
the record. 
II. THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPEAL. 
In finding the Employer sustained its burden of proving the Claimant was 
terminated for just cause, the Board relied on the provisions of the Employment Security 
Act, the Utah Rules of Evidence, and case law. In order to successfully challenge this 
finding, the Claimant "must demonstrate that the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court." Grace Drilling Co. 
v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Court should reject the 
Claimant's appeal for its failure to marshal the evidence in support of her conclusion the 
findings were without foundation. The burden is an extremely heavy one and the 
Claimant has presented no evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome this burden. 
In Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court refused to 
entertain the appellant's factual challenges since the appellant failed to meet its 
marshaling burden: 
[The Appellant] has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the 
finding nor demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous, but instead 
cites only evidence that supports the outcome she desires. See Crooks ton 
v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (citing only evidence 
favorable to one's position "does not begin to meet the marshaling burden. 
. . ."). We therefore assume that the record supports the finding of the 
trial court. Id. at 820. [Emphasis added] 
12 
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This Court expanded upon the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in 
Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994): 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We 
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when 
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1042. 
The Court reasoned that to successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
"appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Parties] must extricate [themselves] 
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.'" Id. at 1053, citing West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). The Court 
further explained that proper marshaling requires the challenger to: 
. . . present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bar tell, 116 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); 
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). 
Oneida at 1053. 
Then, after an appellant has established: 
. . . every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then "must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to 
support the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. 
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to 
be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" Barttell, 776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). 
Oneida at 1053. 
The Claimant here has not met her marshaling burden. She has pointed to no 
evidence in the record to show that the findings of the Board are so "against the clear 
n 
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weight of the evidence" that they are "clearly erroneous." The record below is supported 
by the evidence and entitled to a presumption of validity. See also Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), where this Court held: 
. . . the 'whole record test' necessarily requires that a party challenging the 
Board's findings of fact must marshall all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the . . . contradictory evidence, the findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 67-68. 
In the recent unemployment case of Target Interact US, LLC v. Workforce 
Appeals Bd., 2010 UT App 255 this Court noted the employer failed to marshal the 
evidence on appeal stating: 
we note that Target's briefing is deficient in several respects and that these 
defects alone would be grounds for this court to decline to disturb the 
Board's decision. Of particular concern is Target's failure to marshal the 
evidence in support of the Board's decision. See generally Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 
UT 42, P 17, 164 P.3d 384 & n.3, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384 ("To 
successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party must 
marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Target's 
central disagreement with the Board's decision is factual, and Target's 
failure to marshal the evidence in support of the Board's decision 
impermissibly shifts the burden of combing the record for supporting 
evidence onto this court. 
In a separate concurring opinion in Target, Judge Voros wrote: 
I concur in the result and in that portion of the memorandum 
decision concluding that Target's briefing does not satisfy the 
requirements of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. While 
I agree that Target's claims of error lack merit, I would affirm on the 
ground that they are inadequately briefed. 
The Claimant in this case also failed to meet her marshaling burden. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should find the substantial evidence in the record supports the Board's 
determination the Claimant was discharged for just cause and is therefore ineligible for 
benefits. The Employer successfully established the elements of culpability, knowledge, 
and control. The Claimant also failed to marshal the evidence in support of her appeal. 
The Board's decision was reasonable and rational. As such, the Board requests the Court 
deny the Claimant's appeal and affirm the Board's decision. 
Respectfully submitted this of September, 2012. 
JAMESON R. MAUGHfAN 
Attorney for Respondent 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATIONS 
I CERTIFY that the foregoing Respondent's Brief complies with the type-volume 
limitations. It uses proportionally spaced typeface and contains 4,009 words. 
Jaceson R. Maughan 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief, postage 
prepaid, to the following this /^T^day of September 2012. 
SAM N PAPPAS 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES INC 
8 EAST BROADWAY STE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
WELLS FARGO BANK 
C/O BARNETT ASSOCIATES INC 
PO BOX 7340 
GARDEN CITY NY 11530-0725 
*JL 
rceson R. Maughan' 
Attorney for Respondent 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Workforce Services Code 
Employment Security Act 
35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits. 
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(1) (a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause, 
if so found by the division, and for each week thereafter until the claimant has performed 
services in bona fide, covered employment and earned wages for those services equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. 
(b) A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves work 
under circumstances where it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
(c) Using available information from employers and the claimant, the division shall 
consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the 
extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in 
reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and 
good conscience. 
(d) Notwithstanding any other subsection of this section, a claimant who has left work 
voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join the claimant's spouse to or in a new locality does 
so without good cause for purposes of Subsection (1). 
(2) (a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act 
or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, 
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the division, 
and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
(b) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for dishonesty constituting a 
crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection with the claimant's work as shown 
by the facts, together with the claimant's admission, or as shown by the claimant's conviction 
of that crime in a court of competent jurisdiction and for the 51 next following weeks. 
(c) Wage credits shall be deleted from the claimant's base period, and are not available 
for this or any subsequent claim for benefits. 
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35A-4-508. Review of decision or determination by division — Administrative law 
judge — Division of adjudication — Workforce Appeals Board — 
Judicial review by Court of Appeals — Exclusive procedure. 
(8)(a) Within 30 days after the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued, 
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of 
appeals against the Workforce Appeals Board for the review of its decision, in which 
action any other party to the proceeding before the Workforce Appeals Board shall be 
made a defendant. 
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ADDENDUM A 
63G-4-403. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with 
the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate 
appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
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ADDENDUM A 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
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ADDENDUM A 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue 
all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other 
local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge 
to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of 
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination 
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 
4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session 
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ADDENDUM A 
R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance. 
R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits. 
R994-405-201. Discharge - General Definition. 
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in determining the 
date the employment ended. Benefits will be denied if the claimant was discharged for just 
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, 
which was deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest. 
However, not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of benefits. A just cause 
discharge must include some fault on the part of the claimant. A reduction of force is 
considered a discharge without just cause. 
R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements must be 
satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the employment 
relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the conduct was an isolated 
incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it would be continued or repeated, 
potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor 
in determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith error in 
judgment. An employer might not be able to demonstrate that a single violation, even though 
harmful, would be repeated by a long-term employee with an established pattern of 
complying with the employer's rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the 
conduct, it may not be necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future 
harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. There 
does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; however, it must 
be shown the claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. 
Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a clear explanation 
of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a 
universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had 
knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given 
an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive 
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have been 
followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe infractions, 
including criminal actions. 
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(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are not sufficient 
to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued inefficiency, repeated carelessness 
or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may 
satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be 
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While such a 
circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits will be denied. 
To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due to unsatisfactory work 
performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a 
satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a good faith effort to meet the job 
requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability and a discharge results, just 
cause is not established. 
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ADDENDUM A 
R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance. 
R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits. 
R994-405-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge. 
In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in 
determining eligibility for benefits . . . 
(1) Violation of Company Rules. 
If a claimant violates a reasonable employment rule and just cause is established, 
benefits will be denied. 
(a) An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that 
further legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public policy or that 
infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not be reasonable. If 
a claimant believes a rule is unreasonable, the claimant generally has the responsibility to 
discuss these concerns with the employer before engaging in conduct contrary to the rule, 
thereby giving the employer an opportunity to address those concerns. When rules are 
changed, the employer must provide appropriate notice and afford workers a reasonable 
opportunity to comply. 
(b) If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment contract 
or collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established if the discharge is 
consistent with the provisions of the contract. 
(c) Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were 
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, if a claimant 
was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further violations may result in 
a denial of benefits. 
(d) Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of 
itself, cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the employer's 
ability to maintain necessary discipline. 
(e) Serious violations of universal standards of conduct do not require prior 
warning to support a disqualification. 
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^SS? UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE A D D E N D U M B 
DECISION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
DATE MAILED: 11/14/11 DCVP 
R A N A E NICOL SSN: XXX-XX-X832 
4445 w 4715 S 
KEARNS UT 84118-4742 EMPLOYER: WELLS FARGO BANK 
Notice: This decision is made on your claim for benefits: 
You were discharged from your job for not following a reasonable policy, rule or instruction from your employer. 
You were discharged from your job for just cause. Your conduct was within your control and was adverse to your employer's 
rightful interests. You had knowledge of your responsibilities to your employer or your employer's expectations and you knew or 
should have known the possible adverse effects of your conduct on your employer. 
Benefits are denied under Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the*Utah Employment Security Act beginning October 30, 2011 and ending 
when you have earned wages in bona fide covered employment equal to at least six times your weekly benefit amount and you are 
otherwise eligible. To reopen your claim, you can file on-line at jobs.utah.gov or you can call the Claim Center. This reopening will 
be effective as of the week you reopen your claim. You will be notified separately of any other issues on your claim. 
RIGHT TO APPEAL: If you believe this decision is incorrect, appeal by mail to: Utah Department of Workforce Services, Appeals 
Section, PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244, or Fax (801) 526-9242, or online atwww.jobs.utah.gov. Your appeal must 
be in writing and must be received or postmarked on or before November 29, 2011. An appeal received or postmarked after 
November 29, 2011 may be considered if good cause for the late filing can be established. Your appeal must be signed by you or 
your legal representative. MAKE SURE YOUR NAME IS WRITTEN LEGIBLY AND THAT YOU INCLUDE YOUR SOCIAL 
SECURITY NUMBER AND CURRENT ADDRESS. Also, please state the reason for your appeal. A copy of your appeal will be 
sent to any other interested parties. It is very important for you to continue to file your weekly claims while the appeal process is 
pending. You will not be paid for any weeks not filed timely unless you can show good cause for late filing. 
UTAH CLAIMS CENTER PHONE NUMBERS: S.L.: 526-4400, Ogden: 612-0877, Provo: 375-4067, Out of Area: (888) 848-0688. 
REPR. K Hintze EMP.#: 1000562 
DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE 
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 
*18212452* 
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ADDENDUM C 
Han APDEC DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
04 A P P E A L S S E C T I O N 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Appellant Respondent 
RANAE N1COL WELLS FARGO BANK 
4445 W 4715 S %BARNETT ASSOCIATES INC 
KEARNS UT 84118-4742 PO BOX 7340 
GARDEN CITY NY i 1530-0725 
S,S,A,NO; XXX-XX-4832 CASE NO: ll-A-18336 
APPEAL DECISION: The Department's decision is affirmed. 
The Claimant is denied unemployment benefits. 
The Employer is relieved of charges. 
CASE HISTORY: 
Appearances: Claimant/Employer 
Issues to be Decided: 35A-4-405(2)(a) - Discharge 
35A-4-307 - Employer Charges 
The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant 
was discharged for just cause. The decision also relieved the Employer's benefit ratio account for 
benefits paid to the Claimant. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: This decision will become final unless, within 30 days from December 7, 2011, 
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT 
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://wwwjobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the 
grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment benefits the Claimant worked as a banker for Wells Fargo Bank 
from June 14, 2010, through October 31, 2011, At the end of the employment the Claimant was earning 
SI5.24 an hour. 
The Claimant received the Employer's policy and procedures. The Code of Conduct policy prohibited 
employees from handling transactions on their own accounts or account of relatives. The policy stated 
that reversing service charges or fees was not allowed on your own accounts or that of relatives. 
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RanaeNicol - 2 - ll-A-18336 
At the end of September 2011, the Claimant noticed that the joint account she shared with her son had a 
$10 fee and a $35 overdraft fee on the account. The Claimant asked a supervisor about the fees on her 
son's account. The Claimant expressed that there should not be the $10 service fee because it was a 
member's account and that if the fee would not have been charged, the account would have not been 
overdrawn and the overdraft fee would have not been assessed. The supervisor told her that that she 
could reverse the fees but she would do it at her own risk. She could have called the customer service 
account line as any other customer would to request the fees be reversed. The transaction was audited 
and the Claimant was discharged for violating the policy. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Discharge 
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause for discharging the 
employee. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the employee involved. The 
unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) provide in pertinent part: 
R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements must be 
satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the employment 
relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the conduct was an 
isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it would be continued or 
repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's prior work record is an 
important factor in determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good 
faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able to demonstrate that a single 
violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a long-term employee with an 
established pattern of complying with the employer's rules In this instance, depending on 
the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be necessary for the employer to discharge the 
claimant to avoid future harm, 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. There 
does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; however, it must 
be shown the claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the 
conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a clear 
explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a 
violation of a universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the 
claimant had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should 
$\S C> 
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RanaeNicol - 3 - 11-A-18336 
have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had 
a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally 
must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very 
severe infractions, including criminal actions. 
(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are not 
sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued inefficiency, 
repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a 
similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the ability to 
perform satisfactorily. 
R994-405-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge, 
In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in 
determining eligibility for benefits. 
(1) Violation of Company Rules. 
If a claimant violates a reasonable employment rule and just cause is established, 
benefits will be denied. 
(a) An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that 
further legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public policy or 
that infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not be 
reasonable. If a claimant believes a rule is unreasonable, the claimant generally has the 
responsibility to discuss these concerns with the employer before engaging in conduct 
contrary to the rule, thereby giving the employer an opportunity to address those 
concerns. When rules are changed, the employer must provide appropriate notice and 
afford workers a reasonable opportunity to comply. 
(b) If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment contract or 
collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established if the discharge is 
consistent with the provisions of the contract. 
(c) Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were 
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, if a 
claimant was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further violations 
may result in a denial of benefits. 
(d) Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of 
itself, cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the employer's 
ability to maintain necessary discipline. 
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(e) Serious violations of universal standards of conduct do not require prior 
warning to support a disqualification. 
Culpability is established. The Employer had reasonable expectations for the Claimant to follow the 
Code of Conduct policy. The policy was in effect so that employees could not work on their own 
account. The Claimant working and reversing charges on her own account was harmful to the 
Employer. The fees were not investigated independently. The failure to follow the policy was harmful 
to the Employer's policy and ability to trust the Claimant. The Employer discharged the Claimant to 
avoid any further harm to its interests. 
Knowledge is established. The Claimant knew or should have known the Employer's expectations. 
She knew the policy and was warned that reversing the fees was risky. She should have been able to 
anticipate the negative effect and possible consequences of her conduct based upon the statement by the 
supervisor. 
Control is established. The Claimant had the ability to follow the Employer's expectations. Knowing 
that the Employer expected her not to handle transactions on her own accounts and having been warned 
it was risky, she should have refrained from working on her own account. 
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, all three elements of just cause are established and benefits 
are denied. 
Employer Charges 
An employer may be relieved of charges when the claimant was separated from employment for reasons 
which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35A-4-405(2) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. The Claimant's separation is disqualifying, and the Employer is relieved of charges. 
DECISION AND ORDER: 
Discharge 
The original Department decision denying the payment of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to 
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. Benefits are denied 
effective October 30, 2011, and continuing until the Claimant has worked and earned at least six times 
her weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment and is otherwise eligible. 
V <£ a 
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Employer Charges 
The Employer is relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section 
35A-4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
c ^ — 
Heather Simonson 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
Issued: December 7,2011 
HS/tc 
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ADDENDUM D 
Form BRDEC WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
Issue 04 Department of Workforce Services 
Division of Adjudication 
RANAE NICOL, CLAIMANT 
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-4832 : 
: Case No. ll-B-01808 
WELLS FARGO BANK, : 
EMPLOYER 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed. 
Benefits are denied. 
The Employer is relieved of benefit charges. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a decision dated December 7, 2011, Case No. ll-A-18336, the Administrative Law Judge 
affirmed the Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant 
effective October 30, 2011. The Employer, Wells Fargo Bank, was eligible for relief of benefit 
charges in connection with this claim. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah 
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto. 
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: December 16, 2011. 
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT: 
1. Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of 
§35A-4-405(2)(a)? 
2. Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)? 
FACTUAL FINDINGS: 
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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ll-B-01808 - 2 - XXX-XX-4832 
RANAE NICOL 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Claimant worked for the Employer as a banker from June 14, 2010, until she was discharged 
on October 31, 2011.. The Employer's policy prohibits employees from handling transactions on 
their own accounts or the accounts of relatives. The policy specifically prohibits employees from 
reversing charges or fees on their accounts or the accounts of relatives. The Employer considers a 
single violation of this policy to be sufficient grounds for discharge. 
The Claimant maintained a joint account with her son. Sometime toward the end of 
September 2011, she noticed a $10 fee and a $35 overdraft fee on the account. The Claimant did not 
feel the $ 10 fee should have been added to the account because of the nature of the account. The $ 10 
fee directly resulted in the overdraft fee. The Claimant approached a supervisor about the fee. She 
claims she asked her supervisor if she could reverse the fee and was told that if she reversed the fee 
she did so at her own risk. The Claimant could have called the customer service department and 
asked for the fees to be reversed. Rather than doing so, however, the Claimant reversed the fee 
herself. The Employer later audited the transaction, discharging the Claimant when it discovered 
she had reversed the fee herself. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that the Employer established just cause for its decision to 
discharge the Claimant. 
The Claimant offers no substantive argument on appeal, arguing only that the Administrative Law 
Judge's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Claimant requested a copy of the 
transcript in order to prepare her written argument. She was sent a copy of the transcript on 
January 4, 2012, with a letter instructing her that her written argument must be submitted within ten 
days from the date of the letter. The Claimant's written argument was due by January 14, 2012, so 
that it might be considered by the Board when the Board convened on January 17, 2012, at 10:00 
a.m. The Claimant's written argument was not faxed to the Board until January 17, 2012, at 8:37 
p.m., well after the Board met to consider the Claimant's appeal. As such, the Claimant's written 
argument in support of her appeal was not considered in reaching this decision. 
The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security 
Act provide, in pertinent part: 
R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements 
must be satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
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The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the 
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it 
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's 
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an 
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able 
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a 
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employer's 
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be 
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer 
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the 
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to 
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or 
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of 
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the 
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an 
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive 
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have 
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe 
infractions, including criminal actions. 
(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the 
claimant's control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment 
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued 
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a 
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the 
claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may 
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While 
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits 
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due 
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to 
perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a 
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good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill 
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established. 
In order to establish just cause for a discharge, the Employer must satisfy all three elements of the 
just cause standard. Here, the Employer satisfied the necessary elements to show just cause. 
To establish culpability, the Employer must show the Claimant's conduct was so serious that 
continuing their relationship would jeopardize the Employer's rightful interests. The Claimant was 
discharged for violating the Employer's policy regarding handling transactions on her own account. 
The policy exists to protect the Employer's financial and regulatory interests and it has a legitimate 
interest in its employees following the policy. The Employer considers compliance with the policy 
to be such a serious matter that it discharges employees for a single violation of the policy. Though 
the Claimant violated the policy only once, her conduct sufficiently jeopardized the Employer's 
interests that it necessitated her immediate discharge. The Employer established the element of 
culpability. 
To establish the element of knowledge, the Claimant must have an understanding of the conduct 
expected by the Employer. The Claimant knew that reversing the charges on her own account was 
contrary to the Employer's expectations. The Claimant knew that she was prohibited from handling 
her own account and was specifically warned by her supervisor that she could reverse the charges 
on her account at her own risk. The Claimant also understood the Employer's policy and, when 
confronted by the Employer, admitted that she knew she was not supposed to handle her own 
account. The Claimant also specifically testified that she knew about the policy and decided to 
proceed despite her supervisor's warning that she did so at her own peril. She should have been able 
to anticipate the negative consequences that would result from reversing the fees on her account in 
violation of the Employer's policy. The Employer established the element of knowledge. 
The Claimant was in control of the conduct that led to her discharge. She could have avoided being 
discharged in a variety of ways. The Claimant could have contacted the customer service 
department. She could have asked her son to contact the Employer or the customer service 
department. She also could have heeded her supervisor's warning and simply refrained from 
reversing the fees on her account. The Employer established the element of control. 
The decision denying benefits is affirmed. The Board adopts the Administrative Law Judge's 
reasoning and conclusions of law in full. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying unemployment insurance benefits to the 
Claimant effective October 30, 2011, under the provisions of §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, is affirmed. 
\J>' V 4i 
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The Employer, Wells Fargo Bank, is eligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with this 
claim, as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
Pursuant to §63G-4-302(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request 
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request 
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to each party 
by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an order within 
20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered to be 
denied pursuant to §63G-4-302(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. It is not 
necessary to file a request for reconsideration if you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. If a request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue 
another decision. This decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of 
Appeals and time limitation for such an appeal. 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, 
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ 
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act; §63G-4-401 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ORCE APPEALS BOARD 
Date Issued: January 18, 2012 
TH/CN/DW/HS/JM/cd 0 #. £,yJ*T 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on 
this 18th day of January, 2012, by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, United States mail to: 
LORI JOHNSON 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES 
205N 400W 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84103-1125 
RANAE NICOL 
4445 W 4715 S 
KEARNSUT 84118-4742 
WELLS FARGO BANK 
C/O BARNETT ASSOCIATES 
PO BOX 7340 
GARDEN CITY NY 11530-0725 
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Fo™ BRDEC WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
Issue 04 Department of Workforce Services 
Division of Adjudication 
RANAE NICOL, CLAIMANT 
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-4832 
Case No. 12-R-00062 
RECONSIDERATION 
WELLS FARGO BANK, : 
EMPLOYER 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a letter received on January 20, 2012, the Claimant, Ranae Nicol, requested reconsideration of the decision 
of the Workforce Appeals Board issued in this case on Januaiy 18,2012. The decision of the Workforce Appeals 
Board was based on a review of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge after a formal hearing. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Board has jurisdiction to review the request for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63G-4-
302(3) on the grounds that the Board's decision was final agency action within the meaning and intent of that 
section of law. 
DECISION: 
The Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board dated 
January 18, 2012, remains in effect. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in writing within 
30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the fifth floor of the Scott M. 
Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal 
must show the Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the 
proceeding as Respondents. To file an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the 
Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act; §63G-4-401 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 
24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ORCE APPEALS BOARD 
Date Issued: February 8, 2012 £7) JJ /J J J? <* • 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on 
this 8th day of February, 2012, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
United States mail to: 
RANAE NICOL 
4445 W 4715 S 
KEARNSUT 84118-4742 
LORI JOHNSON 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES 
205 N 400 W 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84103-1125 
WELLS FARGO BANK 
C/O BARNETT ASSOCIATES INC 
PO BOX 7340 
GARDEN CITY NY 11530-0725 
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I WELLS FARGO IMTERNETSEllflnCES GROUP 
HurrvuN Resource Policy 
Reasons far Immadtaf0 ^voluntary Termination 
SEROUS MISCONDUCT 
As employees of Wells Fargo Bank (Bank), wa am responsibla for fsfegiiatdlitfj confidential 
information relative fo customers' (Including fellow employees') finances. In addition, our 
customers and feBoW employes expwt adherence to high standards of intej % honesty, and 
bust from the Bank, Employee responsibilities* Bank Policies, and Praccdure,;i /*ddr»*sihg the 
handling pf 6or business are outlined In the Handbook for Wells Forgo T&am M&mbers and 
Handbook for Wells Fen?o Supvrvi&orz m th* following sactbna: 
- Code of Ethics and Business Conduct (Appendix A) 
• Leaving Wells Fargo Involuntary Terminations (Qhaplur 9) 
When reviewing those Handbooks, pleaae pay specia] attention to the vjolafjc T# considered a* 
"Serious Misconduct", The violations listed constitute grounds for ?rnrn*dfaty tovofimtery 
tercnFnatfon of your empfoyment 
The Purpose of this document is to increase amploys* awareness and imderiftcincfing of the 
acfions thst violate fhft Bank's exiting policies. 
If upon investigation, it k conffrrhod that you engaged In activities considered 'Svrfous 
Misconduct* by the eank/Graup/OrVision, your empfoymont may be Immediately involuntarily 
lerrpmatjsd. 
Examples pondered acts of "Serious Mispondi/cf are listed balow. Please review this 
document carefuQy, It Is important to understand that the items below SWY& <;flly as examples 
and do not encompass all of the reasons for immediate Involuntary termfrwiWcna. 
1 Intentional MSsU**Df the Telephone " ~ ~~] 
Listed below are actions c e n t e r e d as "Serious Misconduct*, Examples of nfeuse occur whan 
I an employe deliberately: 
• Disconnects a customer 
' Tr^nfcfars a rail back Into the queue without first sckncwtedsiing or servicrjfj, a customer 
« Uses the Conference Button inappropriately 
J * Places a customer on hold than makes/engages in a personal call f 
• Makes or receives personal oalte on job time I 
AJso, Intentions) Misuse of ihe Telephone to create a fake statistical wcord (i e,, altering Aver30$ 
) Handle Time statistics) represent? an "Act of Dishonesty". . ^ j 
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Transactions and Approval Polity Violations 
Transactions 
Employes are not to band!* oi approve transactions on their own accounts), ociMunis of 
relatives or members of their household, bcludlng roommates and other unrelated Individuals, 
Exahtples of these transactions are: i 
l» Change of address 
• Increasing AtMcpodrtHmils 
• Changing overdraft (OD) hmft. codes 
• . Changing the number of ou occurrence 
* RBversintf &ervk# charges or tees, I.e., Pricing: Employees are not to vtew tolr own 
sccount($) while logged onto the Pricing 309 screen, as to oxit this scr&fcn requires them to 
I "price their own accounts*. Should ym Yi&w your accounts) whiW logged or *> PndnQ, frk 
action mu5( be sported to a supervisor immediately, 
I As a courtesy, center employees are permitted to access their accounts for Information 
purposes only within center goidelintts. 
Approvals 
If a transaction requires approval, the approval m\ut com** irom tha no*t higher ovol of authority. 
An employee may not request approval of personal transactions by a peer or by a subordinate 
who reports \o \hen\. For example, a supervisor cannot ask another supervisor to twersz and/or 
approve their overdrafts and fees* The supervisor should ask their manager or uriy 'nexMtfgfw* 
lever manager to do their transactions for thern. An agent cannot approach anoihter agent and j 
I ask tham to reverse fees po their account^), The agent should ask thefr superv'scvr ox any *next-
I higher-level" supervisor to do their transaction for them, (These actions constitute '"favors" for 
I friends and co-workers), 
I UfiMUthvrtzed Access to Account R&conSs 
To aoows a customer's account without their approval (including fellow employees;, family I 
members, and persons with whom there is/was personal involvement) for any reason (e.gM to 
obtain another employee's tele phone numbers, birthday, address, etc; to looK u o (ho account 
balance of a celebrity or another employe) is ayaih&t Bank policy. I 
Alternated ToJlar MaoWnzs [ATM) Transactions I 
Makingfictiliou? ATM depostts to receive cash (e.g., empty ATM envelope deposit*, tfaposlUng 
checks drawn against Insufficient funds via the ATM, including on paydays prior h> the availability 
1 of funds) Is against Bank policy* 
Subrouting false ATM claims of any amount (including thosa under $25.00 or tes) is a violation of 
frank policy as Well as illegal. Although tha Bank doe* not question thosQ transitions as a 
matter of practice, reports of ATM claim* are generated and reviewed by the Bank's Audffing 
I Department Wh»n trends an* noted, they are investigated and, \f confrme^, cai&Muto 
ITTBUdulentActfyif/. 
Fate* Bank Ksconis (Porsonmf) 
Fals'rfying t»m wh wis or attendant* records to o>t paid for time not vrorked te a|pin*t Bank 
1 pqfcy.
 m „w~—; — 1 
mm*""""1'" 
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WELLS FARGO INTERNET SERVICES GROUP 
ftuman kwwrQG Policy 
_ _ _ Reasons for Immediate Involuntary Tennittatlon 
TEAM MEMBER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I have read this document and understand that my employment may to immpdiatyl)' and 
involuntarily terminated should I engage In any activities defined and considened art "Reasons for 
Immediate Involuntary Torminatiorr by the Bank, Orwp, and/of DMslon, 
Date Eniptoyte Name(pleasei pnVt) — — g^f  ^y ^ 
Employee Signaiure \ Employee ID Number 
Supervisor Name 
April 1997 revise il August 15,2007 
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JUDGE 
JONES 
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JONES 
JUDGE 
JONES 
JUDGE 
JONES 
HEBDA 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
I am a service manager. 
What was the claimant's job there? 
She was a banker. 
What were her dates of employment, the first date she worked and the last? 
Um her initial hire date was June the 14, 2010. Um the date that she was released 
from the company was October 3st of 2011. 
Was she discharged from the job? 
Uh, yes she was. 
What was her rate of pay at the time of termination? 
At the time it was 15 dollars and 24 cents per hour. 
Why was she terminated? 
She was terminated for a violation of the code of ethics policy? 
What is the code of ethics policy? 
The code of ethics policy is, as indicated here in the exhibit, it basically covers 
many different things but in particular, related to this case, would be crediting fees 
back on your own personal account or that of a close family member. 
Okay, which exhibit is that? 
Let me look at it here, I have two copies here, I'm sorry. I believe it is— 
Judge Simonson, can I give the page number? Is that appropriate? 
Yes, go ahead. 
Page 13 is specific to the—under transactions. 
Which exhibit number? Is that Exhibit 13? 
It's Exhibit 13, that's what I meant. Yes, I'm sorry. It's the second page of the 
policy but 13 is the number. 
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JUDGE 
JONES 
JUDGE 
JONES 
Is that the policy you're referring to, Mr. Jones? 
Yes it is. 
Okay. So go ahead and read the policy she violated into the record. 
Okay it says on Exhibit 13 under Transactions, "Employees are not to handle or 
approve transactions on their own accounts, accounts of relatives or members of 
their household including roommates and other unrelated individuals. Examples of 
these transactions are change of address, increasing ATM credit limits, changing 
overdraft limit codes, changing the number of overdraft occurrences, reversing 
service charges or fees—for example, pricing. Employees are not to view their own 
accounts while logged into the pricing 309 screen as to exit this screen requires 
them to price their own account. Should you view your accounts while logged into 
this pricing, this action must be reported to your supervisor immediately." 
And the one in question would be the initial listing reversing service charges or 
fees. 
JUDGE 
JONES 
What occurred? 
Ranae was found to have reversed some service fees on her own personal account 
or that of a relative. At the time it was discovered she was - she discussed the 
matter with our internal investigator and at that time she admitted that she had 
made those changes to her account which, as the policy states here, is not to be 
done by an employee. 
JUDGE 
JONES 
And what was the fee that was reversed? 
I don't have the copies of the actual fees but it was a fee related to her account, 
either an overdraft or a service fee. The investigators didn't provide me with a copy 
of the exact fees that were in question, only to say that it was a fee on a personal 
account which should not have been reversed. 
JUDGE And if there is a fee she was contesting on an account, on her own account or a 
relative's account, what should she have done? 
JONES 
JUDGE 
JONES 
The correct policy is for her or the relative to contact customer service as any other 
customer would and discuss the matter with them and have it resolved based on 
current policies and procedures as any customer normally would. 
Did she approach a supervisor about that? 
Um at the time when we discussed it with the investigator she did not say that she 
5 
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HEBDA 
JONES 
HEBDA 
had. The only information that was given at that time was that she had entered her 
own account and made the adjustments. 
Why was it necessary to discharge her for this instead of giving her a warning? 
Um basically accessing your own account and making charges is considered serious 
misconduct. And I suppose could have lasting, you know, impacts on the bank if 
people were able to make their own adjustments to their own accounts - you know, 
pretty much any time they wished. And so that is considered one of the serious 
misconducts which can result in termination on the first offense. 
Her appeal letter says this was a ten dollar monthly fee that was placed on a team 
member account which should not have had a fee. And so she reversed it. Is that 
correct, that there shouldn't be a fee on a team member account? 
Team member accounts are not generally assessed fees but there are certain rules 
and regulations and some fees can be assessed depending on what type of fee and 
things like that. In this case I don't have the record of which exact fee was 
reversed. 
Did you speak to her about this matter when it occurred? 
I did not. This matter was uncovered through a normal routine audit and was 
brought to me through our investigations department. I was involved only because I 
was the reporting manager of the individual being questioned. 
Did she ever bring up that she asked a supervisor for authority to do so - reverse the 
fee? 
Not to me, no. 
Any questions, Ms. Hebda, for Mr. Jones? 
Yes. Mr. Jones, now you said there was an internal investigator that questioned the 
claimant. Is that correct? 
That's correct. 
Were you present then, were you listening to the conversation? 
I was; I was present in the room sitting next to Ms. Nicol. 
Okay. What exactly did she say when she was told that it was found that she had 
reversed fees? 
6 
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HEBDA 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
Um the best of my recollection is I was sitting next to her when she was asked if 
she had made, you know, made the reversal of the fees. She said yes, I did that and 
I realize I shouldn't have. And that's kind of where the conversation ended. And 
then the investigator, at that point, you know, just kind of thanked us and wrapped 
up the meeting and asked us to return to our normal duties. 
Okay. So she did acknowledge she should not have done that. 
Yes, she did. 
How did you know she was aware of the written policy that you just read into the 
record which is, I believe, it's Exhibit 13. 
Um the policies are covered during initial training when a banker is hired. It's 
covered in depth and as we have on -1 believe it's 15 bankers are required at that 
point to agree that they have read and understand the policies and of course 
acknowledge that through their signature and the date of that policy. 
Okay and you testified earlier that um often times team members are not to be 
served—or, I'm sorry, not to be charged a ten dollar service fee. And if she had 
been in error, if she had been in error, is it okay to fix that herself or to reverse it 
herself? 
It's not. Even though it may have been in error if it was on the account, there is a 
proper channel and it would have been taken care of and removed promptly 
because it was a team member account with no question by our normal customer 
service procedures. But it's not acceptable to do that on your own. 
Okay. I don't have any other questions at this time. 
The claimant also says she was discharged for hanging up on a customer. Was she 
discharged for that reason? 
She was not. 
Any additional questions, Ms. Hebda? 
Not at this time, thank you. 
Any questions, Ms. Nicol, for Mr. Jones? 
Um, I don't have any questions for him, no. 
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JUDGE Ms. Nicol, we'll come to you now. What was your job with the employer? 
CLAIMANT I was a banker. 
HEBDA I'm having a hard time hearing the claimant, I'm wondering if she could speak up. 
CLAIMANT I was a banker. 
JUDGE What were the dates you worked there, the first day and the last day? 
CLAIMANT Urn June 14th of 2010 and October 31st of 2011. 
JUDGE What was your rate of pay at the end of the employment? 
CLAIMANT $ 17.24 an hour. Oh $ 15.24 an hour, I'm sorry. 
JUDGE Were you discharged from the job? 
CLAIMANT Yes I was. 
JUDGE Were you told why you were being discharged? 
CLAIMANT Iwas. 
JUDGE What were you told? 
CLAIMANT I was told that I had reversed a fee. But the - you know, which I knew I had done 
that. But I felt very intimidated by Ron and the security person and I was in tears. 
And I don't understand how he could say that everything was so calm and 
everybody was nice because I was very upset. I didn't want to write the statement 
and I didn't know 1 had the option to write the statement or sign it. 
JUDGE So what account was this? 
CLAIMANT It was on my son's account. 
JUDGE How old is your son? 
CLAIMANT Mysonis21.22. 
JUDGE Are you a co-signer on that account? 
CLAIMANT Yes, ma'am. 
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So it's also your account? 
Urn— 
If you're a co-signer. 
Yes. 
Okay. So it's your account and your son's. 
It's my son's account and mine, yes. 
Okay so what happened? 
I went on—we were helping customers on the phone, sometimes in order to guide 
them through the internet, we can't log onto their account that would be a violation 
of privacy. So we have to log into our own. 
I had been helping a customer on their internet account and I had pulled up mine 
and I had seen that my son's account had been charged a ten dollar fee and 
additionally an overdraft fee of 35 dollars. I did go to a supervisor and I asked (one 
unintelligible word) in this situation if the fees - you know, the fees shouldn't have 
been charged. And the response that I got was do it at your own risk. Now, risk to 
me—I didn't know if I was risking a write-up, there was nothing said you know, I 
mean, he certainly could have taken the call. Um— 
JUDGE So why didn't you call him? Why did you walk over? 
CLAIMANT Because our supervisors are—the way that it's set up is we sit in certain areas with 
supervisors but my supervisor, Eric, was not there that day. And so I went and 
asked another supervisor. 
JUDGE Okay. So he said do it at your own risk. Why didn't you call a customer service line 
if you had a question or a concern on your own account? 
CLAIMANT Because I trusted my supervisor. I didn't think that he was going to lead me into a 
direction to get me fired. 
JUDGE Okay but he said don't—do it at your own risk. That means there's a potential 
problem with you doing it. So why didn't you say okay, what's the right way to do 
it then? 
CLAIMANT Well because at that point he turned away and said, just, you know that was the 
whole conversation. 
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JUDGE Okay, who was the supervisor? 
CLAIMANT Um,itwasMikeBarr. 
JUDGE MikeBarr? 
CLAIMANT Mmhm. 
JUDGE Okay. So you approached him and you said there was a fee that you didn't agree 
with and what did you ask him? 
CLAIMANT I said there is a fee on my son's account that is a big error. And you know, I don't 
know what to do. The fee is $45, it's not a—you know. I didn't - 1 said it's $45 and 
he said, well go ahead and do it at your own risk. And that's all that was said. And 
so I did that. And you know, if he had said, transfer it to me or - you know, or -
JUDGE Transfer what to him? You didn't have anything to transfer to him. 
CLAIMANT Well if he had come over and looked at it I could have had him take care of it 
himself, you know. Perhaps -maybe he just didn't want to know. I don't know 
what he was thinking at that moment. 
JUDGE What date did you do this? 
CLAIMANT I don't remember the day. At the end of September. I was just coming off a two-
month medical leave. 
JUDGE Did you know there was a policy against working on your own accounts or a family 
member's account? 
CLAIMANT I did know there was a policy but that's why I went to a supervisor for clarification 
and for help. Had I known that I was risking my job I would never have done it. I 
loved my job at Wells Fargo. In fact the same day that I got terminated I had got a 
third quarter, you know, standard of excellence award with my customers, of going 
above and beyond to help them. 
JUDGE Okay, so when you spoke to the initial adjudicator you told them that the statement 
that Mike gave you was different. You told hem "you can do it, but I hope you 
don't get caught." So which one—what did Mike really say? 
CLAIMANT It was ' do it at your own risk' because that's - . You know, when the adjudicator 
called I was very flustered and frightened and, you know, I just felt like I had been 
totally wrong and that there was no other way around it, but -
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When you initially filed for unemployment benefits why did you say you were fired 
for failing a QA? 
Because that's how they discovered the call. Because I had heard about both of 
them, about hanging up on a customer who was being abusive and then I had also 
heard about this reversing the fee. 
Did you appeal this internally? 
With Wells Fargo? 
Yes. 
No. I didn't know I could. (Pause) I was never given that option. Looking back on 
it, I would never have done it. It's -not once would I have had to go through for the 
last month with no money and you know, I can't even get paid for the last three 
weeks that I was on disability because the company is having some issues with my 
doctor. So it's been really difficult. 
And why not just call or have your son call in if there was a concern on his 
account? 
Because my son works as a police officer. He's working the night shift and he'd 
was - been working like 60 hours a week. He was just inundated with stuff. And I 
realize that I should have said, you know, you'll have to do this, I'm sorry, but had I 
known it was risking myjob I would never have done it. Not over ten dollars, that's 
ridiculous. 
So did you reverse the ten dollars or the 4'5 dollars? 
I reversed the ten and there was an overdraft that had been charged because of the 
ten dollar fee. 
So did you reverse the overdraft fee? 
I did. 
Okay, so you reversed 45, not ten dollars. 
Right. Right. 
Okay. Anything else, Ms. Nicol? 
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HEBDA On your son's account? 
CLAIMANT On other accounts. 
HEBDA Okay. Now why didn't you then say to this supervisor, would you do that for me 
since it's against policy? Would you please reverse this fee for me? 
CLAIMANT I, at that moment, was not thinking of policy. You know, I just—that's why -1 was 
confused about it, that's why I asked. 
HEBDA Okay. But when you were confronted by the investigator and with Mr. Jones 
present, isn't it true that you admitted that you knew—you said to them, I know I 
shouldn't have done that. I know that that was wrong. 
CLAIMANT Right. And I did say that. Because, you know, I was figuring I was going to get 
written up. 
HEBDA So you knew you were doing something wrong when you did it. 
CLAIMANT But I asked a supervisor for guidance— 
HEBDA And, and— 
CLAIMANT And that was the advice that I got. 
HEBDA And the guidance you got was that you were taking a risk, correct? And isn't it true 
that you decided to take that risk? 
CLAIMANT Because I was told that I could do it at my own—to do it at my own risk. 
HEBDA And you chose to take the risk. 
CLAIMANT That was not giving me guidance to say hey, you can't do that. That was not saying, 
you know, transfer it to someone else. That was not saying that he would look at it 
and see what he could do. 
HEBDA Okay. 
CLAIMANT He just—it was more of like, he didn' t want to know. 
HEBDA Well—and you didn't ask anybody to do it for you, did you? 
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